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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY-AN ANALYSIS OF THE NONCOMMERCIAL TORT Ex-
CEPTION OF THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF 1976-Olsen ex
rel. Sheldon v. Government of Mexico
INTRODUCTION
In Olsen ex rel. Sheldon v. Government of Mexico,1 the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that subject matter jurisdiction
over Mexico existed by virtue of the noncommercial tort exception2 to
the broad immunity granted foreign states by the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA).3 In making the crucial determination
that the parameters of the FSIA tort section extended to Mexico, the
court provided insight into the workings of the provision. The Ninth
Circuit's analysis was of importance because prior to Olsen no court
had based its immunity decision solely on the tort section.' In addi-
1. Olsen ex rel. Sheldon v. Government of Mexico, 729 F.2d 641 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 105 S. Ct. 295 (1984). The case of Sanchez ex rel. Cernie was consolidated with the
Olsen cause of action at both the trial and appellate levels. Sheldon and Cernie were the
respective guardians of the minor children Olsen and Sanchez. Id.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(a) (1982). The section states:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of
the United States. .. in any case-
(5) not otherwise encompassed in paragraph (2) above, [the commercial ac-
tivity exception] in which money damages are sought against a foreign
state for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property,
occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious act or omis-
sion of that foreign state or of any official or employee of that foreign
state while acting within the scope of his office or employment; except
this paragraph shall not apply to-
(a) any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function regardless of whether
the discretion be abused ....
Id.
The other four exceptions to sovereign immunity are: (1) waiver of immunity; (2)
commercial activity; (3) rights in property taken in violation of international law; and (4)
immovable property. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1)-(4) (1982). These four exceptions will not be
discussed in this comment.
3. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2), (4), 391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1982).
4. For cases using a combination of FSIA exceptions, see DeSanchez v. Banco Central
de Nicaragua, 515 F. Supp. 990 (E.D. La. 1981); In re SEDCO, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 561
(S.D. Tex. 1982); Association de Reclamantes v. United Mexican States, 735 F.2d 1517
(D.C. Cir. 1984); see also Skeen v. Republic of Brazil, 566 F. Supp. 1414 (D.D.C. 1983)
(analyzing portions of the Geneva Convention and the doctrine of respondeat superior in
addition to the "scope of employment" portion of the noncommercial tort exception);
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tion, the court's interpretation is significant because foreign nations
usually decide immunity issues based upon reciprocity of reasoning.6
The court's decision could, therefore, be applied against the United
States in a foreign jurisdiction facing similar facts.'
I. BACKGROUND
The Olsen decision arose out of a plane crash which killed the par-
ents of the plaintiff-appellants. 7 The appellants, Olsen and Sanchez,8
were minor children who sought reversal of the trial court order deny-
ing them United States jurisdiction for their wrongful death action
against Mexico.9 Mexico owned and operated the plane that trans-
ported the appellants' parents, 0 prisoners of Mexico." The parents
were being transferred to authorities in Tijuana for eventual incarcera-
tion in the United States pursuant to a prisoner exchange treaty be-
tween the United States and Mexico.12 Mexico claimed that its sover-
eign immunity's warranted the dismissal of the action due to a lack of
Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980); Frolova v. Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, 558 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Ill. 1983), aff'd, 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985)
(both Letelier and Frolova discuss the act of state doctrine in conjunction with the non-
commercial tort exception).
5. G. BADE, STATE IMMUNITY: AN ANALYTICAL AND PROGNOSTIC VIEW (1984):
Reciprocity is an integral part of the mechanism by which rules of interna-
tional law are created. In a world order still lacking a central law making author-
ity, states are both the makers and subjects of international law. In a sense,
reciprocal treatment is one facet of the equality of states. Every state wants to
be treated no worse than it treats others and can expect no better treatment
than what it affords other states.
Id. at 101.
6. Id. at 101-03. See also 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 580-82
(1968); Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835, 841 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied,
469 U.S. 881 (1984).
7. Olsen, 729 F.2d at 643.
8. Id. at 641.
9. Id. at 643. The appellants specifically alleged that Mexico was negligent in main-
taining, directing, and piloting the airplane. Id. at 647.
10. The appellants' parents were imprisoned in Mexico on a charge of possession of
marijuana. The appellant Erin Olsen was born while her mother was imprisoned in Mex-
ico. The minor Olsen was subsequently brought back safely to the United States. Brief
for Appellant at 2, Olsen ex rel. Sheldon v. Government of Mexico, 729 F.2d 641 (9th
Cir. 1984) [hereinafter Appellant's Brief].
11. Olsen, 729 F.2d at 643.
12. Id. See also Treaty Between the United Mexican States and the United States of
America on the Execution of Penal Sentences, November 25, 1976, 28 U.S.T. 7400, 7401,
T.I.A.S. No. 8718.
13. Sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense which must be specially pleaded, as
Mexico did in this case. See H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1976) [hereinaf-
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FSIA subject matter jurisdiction." The specific facts of the disaster
must be discussed in order to fully understand the jurisdictional argu-
ments set forth."
On a night in October, 1979, a plane carrying guards, pilots and
the appellants' parents left Monterey, Mexico for Tijuana." During the
trip, the pilot was advised of thick fog and decreased visibility at Ti-
juana.17 These conditions prompted the pilot to request an instrument
landing, meaning that he needed landing guidance, in the furm of atti-
tude and location data, from air traffic controllers in order to land the
plane.'" In this instance, the instrument landing is significant because
such a landing at Tijuana airport required the plane to enter United
States airspace.' 9 Consequently, following procedures set forth in a
Letter of Agreement (the "Letter") between the aviation authorities of
the United States and Mexico, Tijuana air control received permission
for the plane to enter United States territory.20 The Letter also pro-
vided for American air controller aid.2 The United States aid was nec-
essary in this situation because Tijuana air control's radar and naviga-
tional systems were inoperative.2 Thus, the Tijuana air control asked
its counterpart in San Diego to radio the instrument landing data to
ter HousE REPORT], reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG., & AD. NEWS 6604, 6616 [herein-
after U.S. CODE]. The absence of sovereign immunity is also a jurisdictional requirement.
See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
14. Olsen, 729 F.2d at 643.
15. See Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849, 851 (S.D.N.Y.
1978). There the court explained:
The Act's central feature is its specification of categories of actions for which
foreign states are not entitled to claim the sovereign immunity from American
court jurisdiction otherwise granted to such states. These exceptions are con-
tained not in the sections of the Act which describe the grounds on which juris-
diction may be obtained, however, but are phrased as substantive acts for which
foreign states may be found liable by American courts. This effects an identity
between substance and procedure in the Act which means that a court faced
with a claim of immunity from jurisdiction must engage ultimately in a close
examination of the underlying cause of action in order to decide whether the
plaintiff may obtain jurisdiction over the defendant.
Id. (emphasis added).
16. Olsen, 729 F.2d at 643.
17. Id.
18. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 594 (1981).
19. Olsen, 729 F.2d at 643.
20. Id. See also Letter of Agreement between Tijuana Approach Control and Mira-
mar (California) Radar Air Traffic Control Facility on Coordination Procedures and Air-
space Utilization, April 1, 1979. Appellant's Brief, supra note 10, at Appendix.
21. Appettant's Brief, supra note 10, at Appendix.
22. Olsen, 729 F.2d at 643.
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the airplane.2 3 Neither the San Diego controllers nor the plane's pilot
were bilingual.2 ' Consequently, the San Diego controllers telephoned
the data to Tijuana air control, which then radioed the information to
the pilot.2
Under these conditions, the plane penetrated almost twelve miles
into United States airspace before beginning its initial descent.2" The
pilot was off course though, and safely abandoned the descent.2 7 The
San Diego controllers then advised the pilot to proceed to other air-
ports where visibility would be better, but the pilot declined the sug-
gestion and attempted a second descent.2 s While still using the naviga-
tional data provided by San Diego, the pilot properly aligned the
aircraft and descended on course, but did not maintain the correct alti-
tude2 9 The plane crashed three-quarters of a mile inside the United
States, killing all of its occupants.3 0
The trial court, after hearing the foregoing facts, granted Mexico's
motion dismissing the wrongful death suit.3 The court held that the
general contacts between the defendant and the forum state did not
provide a basis for personal jurisdiction.2 The district court also held
that personal jurisdiction would be unreasonable because it would vio-
late due process.3 3 The court did not discuss the subject matter juris-
diction issue because its personal jurisdiction holding made such an
analysis unnecessary.
34
The Ninth Circuit on appeal wholeheartedly disagreed with the
district court's treatment of the subject matter jurisdiction issue. Cir-
cuit Court Judge Nelson's opinion made the resolution of the subject
matter jurisdiction issue determinative of the entire controversy.35 The
court based its decision with regard to subject matter jurisdiction on
the FSIA mandate that personal jurisdiction could not exist unless
23. Id.







31. Id. at 643.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Olsen ex rel. Sheldon v. Government of Mexico, 729 F.2d 641 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom., 105 S. Ct. 295 (1984); Sanchez ex rel. Cernie v. Republic of Mexico, No.
81-1067, slip op. at I (S.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 1983).
35. Olsen, 729 F.2d at 644.
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subject matter jurisdiction was first established.-" Subject matter juris-
diction, in turn, cannot exist unless it is established that a foreign state
is not entitled to immunity pursuant to an FSIA exception."7 The dis-
trict court inexplicably reversed the process required by the FSIA and
the appellate court clearly follwed the acknowledged statutory proce-
dure3 8 in correcting the lower court.
In using the proper FSIA structure, the Olsen court first deter-
mined that Mexico was not immune under the tort section, thereby
granting subject matter jurisdiction and clearing the way for a personal
jurisdiction analysis. 39 The court's finding of subject matter jurisdic-
tion necessitated that it grapple with the major ambiguities in the lan-
guage of the provision. The court's reading of the FSIA led it to an
announcement of a new test for determining the extent to which the
tortious conduct must occur in the United States.4 The court also clar-
ified the definition of the main proviso to the section, the discretionary
function exception.4 ' In addition, the court endorsed and refined the
theory that the FSIA had, indeed, modified the restrictive theory of
immunity with respect to the noncomercial tort exception. 3 The
court's attempt to clarify these three areas must be scrutinized in light
of the FSIA policy of maintaining international congruity of reasoning
in foreign sovereign immunity decisions.'3
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1982). See also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 13; U.S.
CODE, supra note 13, at 6612.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a). See also Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S.
480, 489 (1983); Texas Trading and Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647
F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981).
38. See Carl, Suing Foreign Governments in American Courts: The United States
Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act in Practice, 33 Sw. L.J. 1009, 1014 (1979); Kane, Suing
Foreign Sovereigns: A Procedural Compass, 34 STAN. L. REv. 385, 389 (1982); Note, The
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Giving the Plaintiff his Day in Court, 46
FORDHAM L. REV. 543 (1977).
39. The Olsen court also held that personal jurisdiction was consistent with due pro-
cess requirements. This comment will not discuss the Olsen court's analysis of the per-
sonal jurisdiction issue except to note that the court engaged in a "minimum contacts"
examination as first set forth in International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
See Olsen, 729 F.2d at 648-50.
40. Olsen, 729 F.2d at 645-46.
41. Id. at 646-48. The other proviso to the tort exception exempts claims for libel,
slander, misrepresentation and contractual interference from the operation of the tort
statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(B). For cases dealing with this section, see Carey v. Na-
tional Oil Corp., 453 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd on other grounds, 592 F.2d 673
(2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Yessenin-Volpin, 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
42. Olsen, 729 F.2d at 645.
41. See supra nwoUs 5 and 6 and acc mpa ing text. See also Housve RzepORT, supra
note 13, at 13; U.S. CODE, supra note 13, at 6611.
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II. ANALYSIS OF OLSEN'S APPLICATION OF PRECEDENT
A. The Restrictive Theory of Sovereign Immunity
The restrictive theory of sovereign immunity-the concept that
the public or governmental acts of a foreign sovereign are immune, but
acts of a private or commercial nature are not-embodies the overrid-
ing policy of the FSIA today." This has not, however, always been the
primary theory of United States foreign sovereign immunity law." His-
torically, foreign sovereigns were accorded absolute immunity in
United States courts.4
6
By the mid-twentieth century, the courts, while retaining the ab-
solute theory, transferred the determination of the foreign immunity
issue from the judiciary to the executive; in particular to the State De-
partment.4 7 The major State Department proclamation came shortly
thereafter with the release of the Tate letter, which announced a strict
44. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 7; U.S. CODE, supra note 13, at 6605. See
also G. BADR, supra note 5, at 63-70 (the author sets forth the typical tests for differenti-
ating between a public and private act. He advocates the use of an objective distinction
which focuses on the nature of the act). See generally McKeel v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 722 F.2d 582, 583 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 243 (1984); Frolova, 558
F. Supp. at 361.
45. See Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India, 653 F.2d 875 (4th Cir. 1981); T. GIUT-
TARi, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (1970); Kahle and Vega, Immunity
and Jurisdiction: Toward a More Uniform Body of Law in Actions Against Foreign
States 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 211 (1979); von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 33, 39 (1978); Weber, The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, 3 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORDER 1 (1976) (all provide excel-
lent histories of the absolute and restrictive theories of sovereign immunity in the United
States). International law has also adopted the restrictive theory. See, e.g., State Immu-
nity Act, 1978, ch. 33 (United Kingdom); European Convention on State Immunity, art.
4 (1972) (Council fo Europe). See generally G. BADR, supra note 5 (the author analyzes
the similarities among seven major countries' foreign immunity acts).
46. Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). Although this
landmark decision heralded the policy of absolute immunity, Chief Justice Marshall had
the foresight to perceive that this theory could be repealed. As Weber points out: "[Mar-
shall expressly stated that the American Sovereign (apparently meaning the executive
and legislative branches) could legitimately revoke the immunity it otherwise would be
presumed to have granted by announcing its intention to do so." Weber, supra note 45,
at 8.
In actuality, the first mention of the restrictive theory in a United States court came
almost a century later when District Judge Mack advocated its use. See von Mehren,
supra note 45, at 39. See also The Pesaro, 227 Fed. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). The Supreme
Court, however, overruled Mack's opinion. Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562
(1926).
47. See Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943); Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S.
30 (1945). See also von Mehren, supra note 45, at 40.
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adherence to the restrictive theory. 8 Unfortunately, the State Depart-
ment could not consistently follow its own edict because the edict
failed to provide clear guidelines to implement the restrictive policy. 49
The State Department also felt political pressure from foreign coun-
tries seeking immunity.50 As a result, judicial deference faded during
the ensuing years and one court even formulated its own examples of
what constituted a public act of a foreign country and what should be
considered a private act."' In fact, the Supreme Court barely asserted
its recognition of the restrictive theory.52 In late 1976, the FSIA was
passed so as to "create some semblance of order out of the chaos and
to unburden the Department of State from the judicial function and
political pressures."5
Two of the main purposes of the FSIA were directed at the incon-
sistent application of the restrictive theory by the State Department.
The drafters understood the adverse consequences of a disparate treat-
ment of foreign immunity cases.54 To avoid such a crisis, they first
made the judiciary the sole arbitrator of immunity claims.5 " Second,
they codified, for the most part, the restrictive theory by setting forth
the exclusive provisions to be used in making the public-private dis-
tinction. 6 These provisions, which are the aforementioned exceptions
to the FSIA, delineate which foreign acts are private and thereby ac-
tionable. 7 These exceptions, although preclusive, were phrased in a
broad manner in recognition of the court's role as the exclusive adjudi-
cator of immunity cases and the judiciary's resulting need for latitude
48. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor of the Department of State, to
Philip B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEPT. STATE
BULL. 984 (1952). See also Cardozo, Sovereign Immunity: The Plaintiff Deserves a Day
in Court, 67 HARV. L. REV. 608 (1954) (the author gives a contemporary reaction to the
restrictive theory).
49. See Note, supra note 38, at 548-49.
50. Id.
51. Victory Transports, Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336 F. 2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964) cert.
denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965). The court set forth five specific classifications describing
public, and, therefore, immune acts. These were: (1) internal administrative acts, such as
expulsion of an alien; (2) legislative acts; (3) acts concerning the armed forces; (4) acts
regarding diplomatic activity; and (5) public loans. Id. at 360.
52. Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976) (only a plurality of
the Court agreed that the restrictive theory had been adopted by the United States).
53. Sklaver, Sovereign Immunity in the United States: An Analysis of § 566, 8 INT'L
LAW 408 (1974).
54. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 13; U.S. CODE, supra note 13, at 6611.
55. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 7; U.S. CODE, supra note 13, at 6605-06.
56. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 7; U.S. CODE, supra note 13, at 6605-06.
57. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 18; U.S. CODE, supra note 13, at 6616.
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in interpreting them.58 Unfortunately, the same broad language has
often led to confusion.9
The courts have interpreted the tort section as applying to all
noncomercial torts subject to the section's own exceptions.6 0 The pri-
mary exception to the section, the discretionary function provision, al-
lows immunity for acts involving governmental policy decisions.6 1 The
two courts that have interpreted the section, and its discretionary
function exception, have been met by the arguments of foreign sover-
eigns that public acts, as defined by the restrictive theory, are auto-
matically immune under the noncommercial tort exception.2 In re-
sponse, the courts have indicated that both public and private acts are
included in the tort exception. 3 These courts have suggested that the
discretionary function exemption does not significantly limit the
sweeping effect of this section, but merely indicates the Congressional
intent that "some governmental decisions should not be subject to ju-
dicial review."6 In short, these courts espouse the theory that the tort
section and its exception are not subject to the public-private dichot-
omy of the restrictive principle.6
The Olsen court refined this hypothesis when confronted with
Mexico's argument that public acts are automatically immune under
section 1605(a)(5).6 The court perceptively realized that, in terms of
affording a foreign nation immunity for its governmental acts, the tort
provision with its discretionary function exception was tantamount to
the public-private distinction of the restrictive theory." It recognized
that the underlying purpose of both tests-the protection of the for-
eign sovereign's governmental acts from United States jurisdic-
tion-usually leads to the same result.68 The court, therefore, rejected
Mexico's argument on the ground that only discretionary functions are
immune.6 9
The Ninth Circuit also set forth, by means of a statutory analysis,
58. See HousE REPORT, supra note 13, at 18; U.S. CODE, supra note 13, at 6616.
59. See Vencedora Oceanica Navigacion v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de
Navagation, 730 F.2d 195, 205 (5th Cir. 1984) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting in part) (The
dissent criticizes the intended vagueness and ambiguity of these sections).
60. Letelier, 448 F. Supp. at 672; SEDCO, 543 F. Supp. at 567.
61. See infra text accompanying notes 73-101.
62. Letelier, 488 F. Supp. at 671; DeSanchez, 515 F. Supp. at 914.
63. Letelier, 488 F. Supp. at 671-72; DeSanchez, 515 F. Supp. at 914.
64. De Sanchez, 515 F. Supp. at 914.
65. Id.; Letelier, 488 F. Supp. at 673.






an additional and practical reason for rejecting the restrictive theory.
The court noted that the drafters would not have inserted the discre-
tionary function exception in the tort section if they had wanted the
restrictive theory applied."0 According to the court, Mexico's reading of
the section made the discretionary function language superfluous be-
cause if all public torts were automatically read out of the section,
there would be no need for the discretionary function test.7' The court
apparently also considered the traditional canon of statutory interpre-
tation that parts of a statute cannot be rendered nugatory in rejecting
Mexico's argument.
7 2
B. The Discretionary Function Exception
The drafters of the FSIA intended the discretionary function ex-
ception to mirror its counterpart in the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA)73 both in form and in interpretation.7 4 It accomplished the for-
mer by making the provision identical to the FTCA exception7 5 and
left the latter goal to the courts. The Supreme Court set forth its defi-
nition of discretionary function in Dalehite v. United States.7 6 In
Dalehite, the Court held that discretion "includes determinations
made by executives or administrators in establishing plans, specifica-
tions or schedules of operations. Where there is room for policy judg-
ment and decision, there is discretion. It necessarily follows that acts
of subordinates in carrying out the operations of government in accor-
dance with official directions cannot be actionable. 7' Thus, Dalehite
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. The Olsen court did not explicitly state that it was using this rule of statutory
interpretation, but its result clearly implied the use of this maxim. See also 2 J. SUTHER-
LAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4801 (1943). "[Alny attempt to segre-
gate any portion of an act and exclude arbitrarily from consideration any other portion
of the act is almost certain to achieve a result other than that which the legislature
intended." Id., cited with approval in R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICA-
TION OF STATUTES 233 (1975).
73. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2678, 2680 (1982).
74. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 21; U.S. CODE, supra note 13, at 6620.
75. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
76. 346 U.S. 15 (1953). Dalehite was an action against the United States under the
Federal Tort Claims Act to recover damages for a death resulting from an explosion at a
nitrate fertilizer plant. The plaintiffs alleged that the Government was negligent in its
supervision of manufacturing, packaging and shipping the fertilizer. The United States
pleaded sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court agreed with the Government and held
that the decisions that led to the death were made in the exercise of judgment at a
planning level. Thus, these acts were discretionary functions and the United States was
immune from prosecution. Id. at 15-16.
77. Id. at 35-36 (emphasis added).
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interprets discretionary function in accord with its legislative purpose
in that it protects the government against tort liability for errors in
policy decisions and for the carrying out of those decisions."
Dalehite remains good law, but the overwhelming majority of sub-
sequent decisions have narrowed the scope of its discretionary function
definition. Today, most courts do not include the acts of subordinates
in carrying out executive plans as part of the definition. 9 The circuits
have formulated a test which asks whether the act was on the "plan-
ning" or "operational" level of governmental conduct."0 Acts on the op-
erational level are "day to day activities," which perhaps include a
small amount of discretion.8 ' These acts are appropriate for court re-
view. 2 On the other hand, planning level acts basically correspond to
the immune policy judgments discussed in Dalehite.8 3 These planning
level acts, thus, are discretionary functions.
There is also case law, however, that retains the entire holding of
Dalehite as to discretion."' In SEDCO, 5 the court noted that the dis-
cretionary function definition had been debated by courts for decades,
but it felt that the facts before it were similar enough to those in
Dalehite for it to include the "acts of subordinates" reasoning in its
discretionary function definition.' SEDCO has neither been followed
nor reversed by other courts receiving this issue. Accordingly, it does
appear to present a valid alternative to the majority test.
In addition to the aforementioned approaches, the Ninth Circuit
has introduced two new tests to determine discretionary function.
8 7
78. Id. at 28.
79. See, e.g., Lindgren v. United States, 665 F.2d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1982); Payton v.
United States, 636 F.2d 132, 137-38 (5th Cir. 1981); Bernitsky v. United States, 620 F.2d
948, 951 (3d Cir. 1980); Liuzzo v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 923, 924 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
80. Lindgren, 665 F.2d at 980; Liuzzo, 580 F. Supp. at 931; Estrada v. Hills, 401 F.
Supp. 429, 430 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
81. See, e.g., Lindgren, 665 F.2d at 980.
82. Id.
83. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 32.
84. SEDCO, 543 F. Supp. at 561.
85. Id. The SEDCO case involved a massive oil spill emanating from an oil drilling
rig located in the territorial waters of Mexico. The spill polluted nearby Texas shores.
The plaintiffs argued that Mexico was negligent in operating the rig under the noncom-
mercial tort exception. Mexico defended by asserting sovereign immunity status. The
court held that Mexico was immune because the acts were discretionary functions. Id. at
566-67. See also Comment, The Bay of Campeche Oil Spill: Obtaining Jurisdiction over
Petroleos Mexicanos Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 9 EcoL. L.Q.
341 (1981).
86. SEDCO, 543 F. Supp. at 567.
87. See Driscoll v. United States, 525 F.2d 13%, 139 (9th Cir. 19761; see also Lir-
dgren, 665 F.2d at 980.
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The Ninth Circuit only applies these tests after it has performed its
planning-operational level inquiry." First, the court considers whether
the judiciary can effectively evaluate the act. Second, they examine
whether judicial inquiry would impair the smooth administration of
the government."
These general tests set forth by the courts have been somewhat
helpful, but there have also been specific examples of what constitutes
a discretionary act. For instance, an air controller's failure to observe
standard operating procedures has been held to be non-discretionary."
Control tower operators were also deemed to be operational level jobs,
and therefore nondiscretionary.0 ' Surprisingly, there is no case law to
date specifically interpreting the status of a pilot."2
The Olsen court followed the planning-operational level test and
also adopted the two additional Ninth Circuit requirements discussed
above. 3 In addition, the court cited case law classifying the job of air
traffic controller as being nondiscretionary at an operational level."4
The court held that none of Mexico's alleged negligence was discretion-
ary because it all occurred in the process of carrying out the Mexican
Government's plan of transferring the prisoners.96 In short, the alleged
negligence of Mexico in piloting, maintaining and directing the plane
were all on the operational level.96 The court regarded the "acts of sub-
ordinates" language of Dalehite as a dead letter and neglected to dis-
tinguish the recent SEDCO opinion, which followed that doctrine.9
The court's failure to provide reasons for this omission leaves Olsen
susceptible to attack by those courts finding approval in the language
of Dalehite.
The court also failed to justify its use of the two additional Ninth
Circuit tests. Its obvious affirmative responses to the inquiries of why
88. Driscoll, 525 F.2d at 138; Lindgren, 665 F.2d at 980.
89. Driscoll, 525 F.2d at 138; Lindgren, 665 F.2d at 980.
90. Ingham v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227, 238 (2d Cir. 1967).
91. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Weiner, 335 F.2d 379, 396 (9th Cir. 1964); Eastern Air
Lines v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62, 78 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
92. Although there is no specific case law dealing with pilots, a few courts have dis-
cussed expert level positions. These courts have stated that an act that involved "admin-
istration of a mandatory duty" was not discretionary even though a professional expert
was needed to carry out the duty. Estrada, 401 F. Supp. at 431; Strothman v. Gereh, 739
F.2d 515 (10th Cir. 1984). Thus, if a pilot is viewed as an expert who is performing a
"mandatory duty," a finding of nondiscretionary function will result.




97. See supra text accompanying notes 84-86.
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the United States judicial system can evaluate the negligence of Mex-
ico and whether this evaluation would diminish the effective adminis-
tration of the Mexican Government" indicate that the court viewed
these tests as unnecessary. For example, the court stated that it was
well-equipped to adjudicate the negligence issues of this case.99 Be-
cause United States courts have presided over negligence issues for
well over a century, 10 0 the court's question answered itself. Moreover,
the court's answers could not have been material because the disposi-
tive issue-the planning-operational level determination-of the dis-
cretionary function analysis had already been decided. If there is no
policy judgment involved, as decided here, then there can only be tort
liability issues to be adjudicated by United States tribunals. A similar
analysis proves the second inquiry unnecessary. 1'0 Perhaps the court
included these tests as a way of assuring Mexico that its invocation of
jurisdiction would not seriously prejudice Mexico. Even if these tests
were resorted to as a sign of diplomacy, however, the court's cursory
treatment of them renders the gesture meaningless.
C. The Location of the Tortious Conduct
The language of the noncommercial tort exception regarding the
location of the tort has given rise to two related uncertainties in the
judicial interpretation of the section. First, the provision itself, al-
though requiring the injury or death complained of to occur in the
United States, does not state whether the tort or torts causing the in-
jury or death must also take place in this country. 02 Second, assuming
that the tort(s) must occur in the United States, the provision does not
contemplate an Olsen situation in which multiple torts, possibly occur-
ring on both sides of the border have caused the death or injury com-
plained of. At the time of the Olsen decision, the case law had almost
resolved the general location of the tort issue, 0 3 but there had been
98. Olsen, 729 F.2d at 648.
99. Id.
100. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 139-40 (4th ed. 1971).
101. It is difficult to conceive of a tort situation in which denying immunity will im-
pede the "effective administration of a foreign government." Unless the tort is a disaster
of the greatest proportions involving thousands of workers, it is doubtful that summon-
ing those workers involved to testify will significantly impair a foreign state's day-to-day
administration. The Olsen court summarily recognized that it would not cause a prob-
lem. See Olsen, 729 F.2d at 648.
102. See supra note 2.
103. See SEDCO, 543 F. Supp. at 567 (tort, in whole, must occur in the United
States); Frolova, 558 F. Supp. at 362 (tortious act or omission must occur in the United
States); Persinger, 729 F.2d at 842 (tort and injury must occur in the United States); but
see Letelier, 488 F. Supp. at 674 (only injury need occur in the United States);
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only one prior decision addressing the multiple tort situation."0 4
The majority of the case law concerning the tort location problem
has followed the legislative history of the section which asserts that the
"tortious act or omission must occur within the jurisdiction of the
United States."10' 5 The minority has not accepted the logical proposi-
tion that the legislative history controls the section, believing instead
that the language of the provision itself clearly requires only that the
injury occur in the United States.0'0 The Olsen court resoundingly
adopted the majority rule by strictly adhering to the legislative history
of section 1605(a)(5) without alluding to the minority position."0 ' In-
deed, Olsen signals the end of the minority position by definitively re-
affirming the rule that the tort must occur in the United States.' 8
Prior to Olsen, only SEDCO'0 9 had set forth a rule regarding the
multiple tort problem. The plaintiffs in that case sought to defeat
Mexico's sovereign immunity defense by arguing that a tort occurs in
the United States if it affects the United States. '" The situs of the tort
issue is satisfied, the plaintiffs in SEDCO argued, if the tort occurred
partially or totally in the United States."' The court, however, rejected
the plaintiff's arguments and held that the entire tort sequence must
occur in the United States. 2
The court distinguished the facts in SEDCO, in which none of the
tortious conduct occurred in the United States, from the facts involved
herein, in which the alleged negligent piloting of the aircraft occurred
in the United States."" The Olsen court also asserted that the SEDCO
DeSanchez, 515 F. Supp. at 913 (citing Letelier).
104. See SEDCO, 548 F. Supp. at 567. See also Asociacion de Reclamantes v. United
Mexican States, 735 F.2d 1517, 1525 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Because the Asociacion decision
was handed down at approximately the same time as the Olsen decision, the Olsen court
could only rely on SEDCO.
105. See HousE REPORT, supra note 13, at 21; U.S. CODE, supra note 13, at 6619.
106. Letelier, 488 F. Supp. at 674; DeSanchez, 515 F. Supp. at 913; Persinger, 729
F.2d at 844 (Edwards, J., dissenting).
107. Olsen, 729 F.2d at 645.
108. Post-Olsen decisions have strongly affirmed its position that the tortious con-
duct must occur in the United States. See Kline v. Republic of El Salvador, 603 F. Supp.
1313 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Frolova, 761 F.2d 370.
109. SEDCO, 543 F. Supp. 561.
110. Id. at 567. The effects argument of the plaintiff is definitely not applicable to
the noncommercial tort exception. It is properly used with respect to the commercial
activity exception. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1982). See generally Note, Effects Juris-
diction Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and Due Process Clause, 55
N.Y.U. L. REv. 474 (1977).
111. SEDCO, 543 F. Supp. at 567.
112. Id. at 567.
113. Olsen, 729 F.2d at 646.
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rule would induce foreign states to allege that some tortious conduct
occurred outside the United States and consequently escape United
States jurisdiction.' 1 4 The Ninth Circuit reasoned, therefore, that a key
policy of the FSIA, namely to "serve the interests of justice . . . and
protect the rights of both foreign states and litigants in the United
States courts" 5 would be subverted by the SEDCO rule. 16 For this
reason, the court set forth a new rule, but did not explicitly limit the
rule to these facts or declare it to be all-encompassing. Specifically, the
court held that if the plaintiffs (appellants here) alleged that one tort
occurred in the United States, then the tort location requirements of
the provision are satisfied."' In failing to discuss why its rule would
better protect both foreign states and litigants than the SEDCO rule,
however, the court did not adequately explain the significance of a sin-
gle tort.
Apparently, the Olsen court had other motives in promulgating
the new rule because its rule suffers from the same type of handicap as
that in SEDCO. The Olsen court's rule encourages plaintiffs to allege
that tortious conduct occurred inside the United States. This conse-
quently deprives foreign nations of their rights under the FSIA.'18 Part
of the motivation of the court, although never expressed in the opinion,
could lie in "serving the interests of justice"""9 by not rejecting the
claim of these two young United States orphans, 20 who sought to have
their wrongful death suit adjudicated in a United States forum. The
court probably felt that the overriding equitable concern in this case
required the protection of the rights of the United States litigants,
which, in turn, necessitated the court's adoption of a liberal one tort
rule rather than the strict SEDCO rule.
CONCLUSION
The drafters of the FSIA sought to promote uniformity in the
making of foreign sovereignty decisions. The courts can only achieve
this uniformity by conforming to the exact statutory jurisdictional
scheme set forth in the FSIA, and by interpreting its substantive ex-
ceptions in a consistent manner. Specifically, courts should follow the
lead of the Olsen court in adhering to the FSIA jurisdictional plan. In
114. Id.
115. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1982).
116. Olsen, 729 F.2d at 646.
117. Id.
118. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1982).
119. Id.
120. The Olsen girl was five years old at the time of the appellate argument, the
Sanchez girl was eight years old. Appellant's Brief, supra note 10, at 2.
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addition, courts should recognize the far-reaching substantive signifi-
cance of the Olsen decision in clarifying both the restrictive theory and
the scope of the discretionary function definition. On the other hand,
the Olsen court's one tort rule must be interpreted in light of the un-
usual factual circumstances of this case, 12' and should not be applied
blindly in every multiple tort situation. Also, courts should not adhere
to unnecessary formalities, as the Olsen court did, in applying the ex-
tra discretionary function tests.
22
In light of the Olsen decision, the United States judiciary must
take note of the preeminent role it plays in making foreign sovereign
immunity decisions. Consequently, it must draft opinions which do not
contain biased or unjustified conclusions. Such decisions lead to incon-
sistent applications of the law that could have international immunity
decisionmaking ramifications.'23 Such decisions could also jeopardize
our nation's foreign relations.2 The legal community and the general
public would prefer to see the cooperation between countries that is
demonstrated by the Letter of Agreement between the United States
and Mexico" 2 rather than witness a vindictive reciprocity of foreign
immunity decisions. Unfortunately, such an exchange is likely in the
event of a discriminatoy tyeatment of foyeign immunity cases by
United States courts.
Michael A. Miranda
121. The plane crash was only 1300 yards inside the United States. It would have
been in Mexican territory within 30 seconds. Brief for Appellee at 6-7, Olsen ex rel.
Sheldon v. Government of Mexico, 729 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1984). Of course, if the plane
had not crashed on American soil, there would have been no jurisdiction because the
wording of the tort section requires that the injury occur in the United States. See supra
text accompanying note 102.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 98-101.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
124. See HousE REPORT, supra note 13, at 45; U.S. CODE, supra note 13, at 6634: "The
broad purpose of this legislation . . . [is] to minimize irritations in foreign relations aris-
ing out of such litigation." Id. See generally G. BADR, supra note 5.
125. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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